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ABSTRACT
Beginning with Agins v. City of Tiburon, and continuing for 25 years, the United States 
Supreme Court has held that regulation effects a taking when it does not substantially 
advance legitimate state interests.  Throughout this period, many have criticized this 
standard as “a return to Lochner,” opposed to the extreme deference accorded economic
and property regulation since the New Deal.   
A careful review of cases reveals, however, that the “substantial advancement” doctrine is 
not simply a means-ends review of the efficacy of economic legislation.  Rather, the 
doctrine was initially conceived, and has been applied, as a cause-effect test to ensure that 
restrictive land-use regulations are designed to mitigate social costs that would be caused 
by the unregulated use of the property in question.  Although no return to Lochner, in 
some cases (most recently in Lingle v. Chevron) the doctrine confronts the need to set 
limits to the proper exercise of the police power – a function that has been abdicated by 
the judiciary since Nebbia v. New York.  This deeper conflict explains the vehemence of 
Agins’ critics and, the article concludes, must be resolved if takings law is to shed its 
post-New Deal ambiguity and function effectively in the unending struggle of 
constitutional principle against legislative will.
1 Attorney and National Litigation Fellow, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, 
CA (ls@pacificlegal.org).  I am grateful to R.S. Radford, Director of Pacific Legal 
Foundation’s Program for Judicial Awareness for his suggestions and contributions to 
this Article.
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3INTRODUCTION
In Agins v. City of Tiburon2 the United States Supreme Court stated that a zoning 
regulation “effects a taking if the ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate 
state interests.”3  The essence of a taking, wrote Justice Powell, was the “determination 
that the public at large, rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of 
state power in the public interest.”4  Since that time, the Court has cited or discussed this 
standard5 in nine cases during the past 25 years.6
Nonetheless, many commentators have argued that Agins should not  be taken too 
seriously:  that its substantial advancement language is a return to abandoned standards of 
judicial review typified by Lochner v. New York7 or a sloppy injection of economic due 
2 447 U.S. 255 (1980)
3 Id. at 260.
4 Id. 
5 The Court’s inquiry as to whether or not a regulation “does not substantially 
advance legitimate state interests” is variously referred to throughout this paper as the 
substantial advancement doctrine or the first prong of the Agins test.
6 See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 
U.S. 302, 334 (2002); City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes at Monterey, 526 U.S. 687, 
704 (2002); Pennell v. City of San Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 19 (1988)(Scalia, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part); Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 385 (1994); Lucas v. 
South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1016 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 
503 U.S. 519, 534 (1992); Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictus, 480 U.S. 
470, 485 (1987); Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); United 
States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 126 (1985).
7 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  See, e.g.,  Ronald H. Rosenberg and Nancy Stroud, When 
Lochner Met Dolan: The Attempted Transformation Of American Land-Use Law By 
Constitutional Interpretation, 33 Urb. Law 663, 669-70 (2001).
4process doctrine into takings law; an ill-considered means/ends test out of step with the 
logic of the takings clause.8  This is argued despite the fact that the Court continues to 
discuss it and has declined to disavow the doctrine.9  The recent grant of certiorari in 
Lingle v. Chevron,10 however, provides the Court with a clear opportunity to clarify the 
meaning and use of the Agins standard in regulatory takings cases.
In the Chevron case,11 the Ninth Circuit was called on to determine whether a rent 
control regulation capping the rent at which oil companies could lease gas stations to 
independent dealer-operators took the oil companies’ property for public use without 
compensation.  The stated purpose of the law was to reduce consumer gasoline prices.12
The court applied the Agins test as a straightforward means-ends review of economic 
regulation, finding that it effected a regulatory taking.  The key to the judgment was a 
8 John D. Echeverria, Does a Regulation That Fails to Advance a Legitimate 
Governmental Interest Result in a Regulatory Taking?, 29 Envtl. L. 853, 858 (1999); 
Brief For Petitioners, Lingle v. Chevron, No. 04-163, 2004 WL 2811060 (December 3, 
2004), at 23-28.
9 See R.S. Radford, Of Course a Land Use Regulation That Fails to Substantially 
Advance Legitimate State Interests Results in a Regulatory Taking, 15 Fordham L. Rev. 
353, 369-72 (2004) (discussing the court’s refusal to disclaim the standard in Del Monte 
Dunes despite the urging of the Solicitor General of the United States to do so).
10 Lingle v. Chevron, 125 S. Ct. 314 (Mem.) (Oct. 12. 2004) (granting cert.).
11 The case was lodged in the U.S. District Court for the District of Hawaii as 
Chevron v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. 2d 1003 (1998).  Durings its appeals in the Ninth 
Circuit it was styled as Chevron v. Lingle, reflecting the change in Hawaii’s governorship.
12 See Haw. Rev. Stat. § 257(4)(1997) (stating “In a highly concentrated market, 
market prices tend to rise above competitive levels. Market prices persistently above 
competitive levels are harmful to consumers and the public”); Chevron v. Cayetano, 57 F. 
Supp. 2d at 1010 (finding “that while the legislature was mindful of the need to protect 
lessee dealers, this consideration was essentially a step toward the ultimate goal of 
(continued…)
5determination that the design of the statute rendered it incapable of substantially 
advancing the goal of lower consumer gasoline prices.  I review the context of Chevron
in Part I of this article and argue that the Ninth Circuit has misapplied the Agins test.13
Whatever the ultimate outcome of Chevron before the Supreme Court, however, 
this case is a good place to begin a wider investigation into the meaning of the substantial 
advancement test in takings law.  The Ninth Circuit and many commentators believe that 
the test weighs (rightly or wrongly) the efficacy of regulation;14 that it applies heightened 
judicial scrutiny to regulations in order to determine whether they will succeed in 
achieving the stated purpose for which they were enacted.  In addition to supporting the 
idea that Agins is an accidental lumping together of takings and due process concerns, this 
view leads to odd results.  Why, for instance, would a regulation that substantially 
advances a public purpose, while disproportionately burdening an individual property 
owner, not be a taking?15  If the effect of the regulation causes an individual to bear alone 
reducing gasoline prices for Hawaii’s consumers.”).
13 See infra, text at notes 59-67
14 See Molly S. McUsic, The Ghost of Lochner: Modern Takings Doctrine And Its 
Impact On Economic Legislation, 76 B.U.L. Rev. 605, 636 (1996); Frank Michelman, 
Takings, 1987, 88 Colum. L. Rev. 1600, 1604-05 (1988)
15 A plausible response might be that such a regulation could be struck down under 
Agins’ second prong, for depriving the owner of economically viable use of the property.  
See Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.  This element of the Agins test derives from Penn Central 
Transportation Corp. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978), where it referred to 
depriving commercial rental property of a competitive rate of return.  Id. at 138, n.36.  
Since the Court’s decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 512 U.S. 374 
(1994), however, Agins’ second prong has almost invariably been misstated as requiring 
deprivation of all economically viable use – which the Court recently redefined as loss of 
all value.  See Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 
(continued…)
6costs that should be borne by the public, it would appear to be just the sort of 
circumstance the takings clause was meant to remedy.16   Further, the Supreme Court has 
not shown any general inclination to reverse its long standing policy of extreme deference 
to legislatures enacting economic regulation.17
In part II of this Article, I argue that the Supreme Court does not conceive the 
Agins test to measure the efficacy of a regulation in achieving alleged state interests or as 
second-guessing legislative judgments in that regard.18  Rather, members of the Court 
who have spoken to the issue have a narrower concern: whether a regulation justly 
mitigates an alleged “social cost”19 caused by the unregulated use of property.  Where the 
535 U.S. at 332.  Consequently, the second prong of Agins no longer retains any content 
as an independent, substantive takings test. 
16 Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987) is, in my 
opinion, a case in which such a result was in fact reached.  In dissent, Chief Justice 
Rehnquist noted that previous cases “have never found it sufficient that legislation 
efficiently achieves its desired objectives to hold that the compensation required by the 
Fifth Amendment is unavailable.”  Keystone, 480 U.S. at 512 (Rehnquist, C.J., 
dissenting).  For a further discussion of the “paradox of efficient regulation” see William 
A. Fischel, Exploring the Kozinski Paradox: Why is More Efficient Regulation a Taking 
of Property?, 67 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 865 (1991). 
17 Cf. Concrete Pipe & Prods. Of Ca., Inc. v. Constr’n Laborers Pension Trust, 508 
U.S. 602, 637 (1993) (noting the continuing policy that regulations “adjusting the burdens 
and benefits of economic life come to the Court with a presumption of constitutionality.”)
18 See infra, text at notes 146-169.
19
“Social costs” are typically understood as actions by firms or individuals that have 
harmful effects on others.  See generally R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. 
Law & Econ 1-44 (1960).  The term “social cost” is used reluctantly, but made necessary 
by the imprecision at the heart of the substantial advancement doctrine.  Society is merely 
a large collection of individuals; there is no “entity apart from and superior to the sum of 
its individual members.”  See Ayn Rand, Collectivized Rights, in the VIRTUE OF 
SELFISHNESS 118, 120 (1964).  Where nuisances or other potentially improper uses of 
(continued…)
7burden imposed on a property owner is divorced from or disproportionate to the social 
costs his property causes, a taking is likely to be found.  I suggest that the substantial 
advancement test functions to channel the regulation of property between the poles of 
judicial review established by Nebbia v. New York20 and Lochner v. New York.21 Nebbia-
style deference to property regulation would undermine the operative principle of the 
takings clause, which is to “bar Government from forcing some people alone to bear 
public burdens.”22  Strict adherence to that principle, however, would breach modern 
sensibilities about judicial restraint, represented by widespread hostility to the Court’s 
judgment in Lochner.23  The Court therefore applies the substantial advancement standard 
not as a mean/ends inquiry but as a cause-effect test, in an effort to unmoor takings 
jurisprudence from any particular theory of rights or economics.  It does so to escape the 
property impose unjust burdens on others, those costs are borne not by “society,” but by 
particular persons.  The term “social costs” serves to blur the rights involved when 
conflicts arise and confer standing on parties who ought have no interest in the 
controversy.  Furthermore, one consequence of the term’s widespread use is to maintain 
an ambiguous definition of “harm” in the property rights context, which is a basic cause 
of its muddled jurisprudence. 
20 291 U.S. 505 (1934).
21 198 U.S. 45.
22 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 48 (1960).
23 See David E. Bernstein, Lochner Era Revisionism, Revised: Lochner and the 
Origins of Fundamental Rights Constitutionalism, 92 Geo. L. J. 1, 1-5 and n. 12 (2003) 
(describing the typical view of Lochner and noting that the case “was so reviled that as far 
as this Author can determine, between the demise of Lochner in West Coast Hotel v. 
Parrish in 1937 and publication of Bernard Siegan’s Economic Liberties and the 
Constitution in 1980, hundreds of passages appeared, but only a single article that 
expressed even mild support for Lochner was published”).
8criticisms of Lochner while upholding what it regards as the essence of the takings clause.  
This approach is employed to cope with precedent and other institutional constraints.24
I argue in Part III, however, that this attempt to find a doctrinal middle ground is 
fundamentally flawed.25  The substantial advancement test purports to protect the rights 
of property owners by raising the level of judicial scrutiny applied to property regulations.  
Since the Court often fails to precisely identify the object of scrutiny, however, the test 
invites misapplication as a displaced due process standard.  On the surface, a cause-effect 
test deflects critics who decry the intrusion of allegedly due process concerns into takings 
law.  A shift from a means-ends to cause-effect analysis of property regulations, however, 
does not eliminate the need for judges to determine the Constitutional legitimacy of 
regulatory ends.  I argue that the substantial advancement test protects property rights 
only insofar as it incorporates individualist values concerning the legitimate ends of 
property regulation.  My conclusion is that Agins does not mistakenly apply due process 
standards to takings law, but does mask old and necessary questions concerning the 
rightful scope of legislative authority—questions once considered in due process cases, 
but that have been evaded since Lochner’s repudiation.
24 See infra, Part II; see generally Molly S. McUsic, Looking Inside Out: 
Institutional Analysis and the Problem of Takings, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 591 (1998).
25 See infra, text at notes 176-198.
9I.  AGINS, THE SUBSTANTIAL ADVANCEMENT
 DOCTRINE, AND LINGLE v. CHEVRON
The roles of due process and takings analysis are often distinguished on the basis 
that, unlike a concern for due process, the takings clause “is designed not to limit the 
governmental interference with property rights per se but rather to secure compensation
in the event of otherwise proper interference amounting to a taking.”26  Were the Court to 
invalidate a general economic regulation on the premise that it insufficiently advances a 
legislative goal, it would be in “uneasy tension with [the Court’s] understanding of the 
Takings Clause,”27 because it would “open the door to normative considerations about the 
wisdom of government decisions.”28  The classic form of judging the wisdom of 
government decisions is a determination that the objective of the regulation is 
insufficiently related to the means employed to achieve it.29  This is why commentators 
view “the rationale for applying a means-ends test in challenges under the Takings Clause 
26 First English Evangelical Lutheran Church v. County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 
304, 314 (1987); Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 554 (1998) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting) (noting that unlike the due process clause, the takings clause did not concern 
the “prevent[ion] of arbitrary or unfair government action, but with providing 
compensation for legitimate government action that takes ‘private property’ to serve the 
‘public’ good.”).  Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922) (implying 
that a regulation warranting compensation under the takings clause is valid under the due 
process clause since it “presupposes that it is wanted for public use”).
27 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 545 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the 
judgment and dissenting in part). 
28 Id.
29 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56 (holding that a regulation “must have a more direct 
relation, as a means to an end . . . to be valid”).
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[as] suspect.”30  The analysis of rent control statutes in three recent Ninth Circuit cases 
exhibits elements of this tension between Due Process and Takings doctrine.  
A.  Agins Applied To Rent Control
Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu ,31 Chevron v. Lingle,32 and Cashman 
v. City of Cotati33 each involve challenges to regulations aimed at lowering rents of 
varying types, and the Ninth Circuit has found a taking in each case because the 
regulations failed to substantially advance legitimate governmental interests.  In each of 
these cases the Court of Appeals invoked Agins in applying heightened scrutiny to the 
rent control measure in question.  The key to finding a taking in each case was that the 
benefits of reduced rents could be capitalized by the initial tenants and sold to their 
successors in interest.  The general rule enunciated by the Ninth Circuit is that rent 
regulations of this type are unconstitutional on their face under Agins, absent some 
mechanism or market feature that could prevent tenants from simply cashing out the 
expected monetary value of rent control by collecting a “premium” on the sale of their 
tenancies to third parties.34
30 John D. Echeverriea, Does a Regulation That Fails To Advance A Legitimate 
Governmental Interest Result In A Regulatory Takings?, at 857-59; see also Jerold S. 
Kayden, Land Use Regulation, Rationality and Judicial Review: The RSVP in the Nollan 
Invitation (Part I), 23 Urb. Law. 301, 316-320 (1991).
31 124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997).
32 363 F.3d 846 (9th Cir. 2004).
33 374 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 2004).
34 See Cashman, 374 F.3d at 897.
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The Ninth Circuit’s reasoning in these cases descends from the Supreme Court’s 
observation in another rent control case, Yee v. City of Escondido.35  There Justice 
O’Connor wrote that the financial capitalization of the value of rent control by tenants 
“might have some bearing on whether the ordinance causes a regulatory taking, as it may 
shed some light on whether there is a sufficient nexus between the effect of the ordinance 
and the objectives it is supposed to advance.”36 Yee was brought to the Court on the 
theory that an Escondido, California, rent control ordinance (in conjunction with 
statewide eviction controls) was tantamount to a permanent physical occupation of the 
park owners’ property interest.  A  regulatory takings inquiry, therefore, did not arise.37
Justice O’Connor’s dicta, however, was taken as an invitation to bring a regulatory 
takings challenge to this type of rent control under Agins.
1.  Richardson
Richardson, the first Yee follow-up case to be heard by the Ninth Circuit on 
its merits,38 challenged two ordinances affecting rental property in Honolulu.39  The 
35 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
36 Id. at 530.
37 Id. at 533 (the question of whether a regulatory taking occurred was not “properly 
before [the Court].”).
38 A number of cases germane to Yee were appealed to the Ninth Circuit, but were 
settled on procedural grounds.  See e.g., Carson Harbor Village, Ltd. v. City of Carson, 
37 F.3d 468 (9th Cir. 1994); Levald, Inc. v City of Palm Desert, 998 F.2d 680 (9th Cir. 
1993); Mission Oaks Mobile Home Park v. City of Hollister, 989 F.2d 359 (9th Cir. 
1993); Palomar Mobilehome Park Assoc. v. City of San Marcos, 989 F.2d 362 (9th Cir. 
1993); Azul-Pacifico, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 973 F.2d 704 (9th Cir. 1992).
39 See Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1153 (describing Honolulu City & County, Haw. 
(continued…)
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stated purpose of these measures was to remedy certain alleged failures of Hawaii’s 
real estate market, including a concentration of land ownership and property 
prices deemed excessive.40  One effect of the high concentration of land ownership is that 
a significant percentage of Honolulu’s condominiums  are owned in  fee simple, but  the 
land on which the condominium buildings are constructed is held under a long-term 
lease.41
Ordinance 91-95 authorized the use of the state’s condemnation power to convert 
the lessees’ leasehold estates into fee simple interests.42  The second measure, Ordinance 
91-96, capped increases in ground rents according to a formula calculated to hold these 
rents below market levels.43  The ordinance further specified that the below-market 
ground leases must be transferred without modification to the new owner-occupants 
whenever a condominium was sold.44  The Ninth Circuit upheld Ordinance 91-95 was 
upheld by the Ninth Circuit under the Supreme Court’s precedent in Hawaii Housing 
Authority v. Midkiff.45 Midkiff approved a similar lease-to-fee transfer law in 
Ordinance 91-95 and 91-96 (1991)).
40 See id. at 1154.
41 See id. at 1159 (citing legislative finding that in 1987, 50.4% of all Honolulu 
condominium units were situated on leased land owned by 60 persons).
42 Ord. 91-95 § 5.2.
43 Id. § 1.5(b).
44 Id. § 1.10.
45 See Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1157 (citing Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 
467 U.S. 229 (1984)).
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1984 against a takings clause challenge.46  Ordinance 91-96, however, was held to
be a taking without compensation and the law was set aside.47
The key to the Ninth Circuit’s ruling lies in the unique circumstances of what 
Professor Hirsch refers to as “immobile housing assets under divided ownership.”48  In 
Hawaii’s condominium market, as with the California mobile home parks at issue in Yee,
one party commonly owns a residential structure situated on land that is leased or rented 
from someone else.  The cost of housing in such markets is the sum of two variables: the 
price of the structure (the condominium or mobile home coach), plus the discounted value 
of the stream of ground rent payments over the life of the structure.49  Other things equal, 
changes in the actual or expected amount of the ground lease will have an inverse impact 
on the price of the structure.50
In this market environment, the imposition of rent control creates opportunities for 
windfalls that can be captured by tenants in occupancy at the time the regulations are 
adopted.51   From the viewpoint of prospective buyers of condominiums or mobile home 
46 Id. at 245.  Unlike the more current Ninth Circuit cases, Midkiff was not an action 
for compensation but sought to enjoin implementation of the transfer law on the basis that 
it was not a Taking for public use.
47 Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1166 (“We accordingly hold that Ordinance 91-96 
violates the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.”).
48 See Werner Z.Hirsch & Anthony M. Rufolo, The Regulation of Immobile Housing 
Assets under Divided Ownership, 19 Int’l Rev. L. & Econ. 383 (1999).
49 See id. at 384-87.
50 See id.
51 This opportunity for tenants to directly convert the benefits of the regulations to 
(continued…)
14
coaches, the prospect of reduced ground rents increases the price they are willing to pay 
for the structure.  Incoming tenants pay at the margin the discounted present value of 
reduced rents in the form of a “premium,” or increment to the price paid for the 
condominium or coach.  Outgoing tenants would pocket the full economic value of the 
regulations, incoming tenants would enjoy no reduction in the net cost of housing, and 
land owners would be saddled with below-market returns on their investment solely to 
facilitate a one-time wealth transfer between third parties.  This is the regulatory scenario 
that both the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii52 and the Ninth 
Circuit determined did not comprise a substantial advancement of legitimate state 
interests in Richardson.53
2.  Cashman
A closely analogous regulatory scheme played out to the same result in 
Cashman.54  California mobile home park owners are prevented by state law from having
any voice in the in-site sale of their tenants’ coaches,55 and local rent control ordinances 
like the City of Cotati’s prohibit them from raising space rents upon the sale of a coach in 
cash is what distinguishes rent control under divided asset ownership from garden-variety 
apartment rent control.  See Fischel, supra note 15, at 873-76.
52 See Richardson v. City and County of Honolulu, 802 F.Supp. 326 (D. Hawaii, 
1992).
53 See 124 F.3d 1166.
54 See Cashman, 374 F.3d at 899.
55 Cal Civ. Code §§ 789-99.7.
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their park to a new tenant.56  Exactly as in the case of Honolulu’s condominiums, the 
tenants who occupied Cotati’s mobile home parks at the time rent control was imposed 
were able to capture a regulatory windfall by selling their coaches at a premium, keeping 
the affordability of Cotati’s housing the same but forcing park owners to bear the burden 
of facilitating a private wealth transfer.57  In Cashman the California city of Cotati’s 
mobile home rent control program was held to be a taking.58  Although the ordinance 
stated seven goals, summarized by the District Court as the city’s “interest in maintaining 
affordable rent, lessening inequality of bargaining power and permitting landlords a 
reasonable rate of return,”59 the Ninth Circuit focused on the program’s operative 
effect of enabling tenants to capitalize the value of the regulations into premiums in 
the resale price of their coaches.60  Because it perceived Cotati’s rent ordinance as 
merely facilitating a  private wealth transfer, the  Court of Appeals followed its holding in
56 See Mobilehome Park Space Rent Stabilization Program, City of Cotati Ordinance 
No. 680 (1998), at § 19.14.150 (2)(c).
57 See e.g., R.S. Radford, Why Rent Control is Still a Regulatory Taking, Program 
for Judicial Awareness Working Paper No. 05-0001 9-16 (Jan. 12, 2005) (citing Werner 
Z. Hirsch & Joel C. Hirsch, Legal-Economic Analysis of Rent Controls in a Mobile Home 
Context: Placement Values and Vacancy Decontrol, 35 UCLA L. Rev. 399, 423-24 
(1988)).
58 Cashman v. City of Cotati, 374 F.3d 887, 899 (2004) (“The district court holds 
that summary judgment is appropriate because this possibility of a premium prevented 
Hawaii's rent control ordinance from substantially advancing its purpose.  We affirm.”) 
(internal citation omitted).
59 Cashman, 374 F. 3d at 896.
60 See id. at 897.
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Richardson and struck down the regulations for failing to substantially advance legitimate 
state interests.61
3.  Chevron
Chevron, which was decided between Richardson and Cashman, is in many ways 
the most problematic of the three cases.  Like Richardson, Chevron springs from a 
Hawaii rent control ordinance, albeit commercial rather than residential.  Many of 
Hawaii’s gasoline stations are owned by major oil companies and leased to independent 
dealers who operate them.  In an effort to lower gasoline prices, the Hawaii legislature 
enacted Act 257 to cap the rents which oil companies can charge lessee-dealers.62
Alternative objectives of the Act have been argued at various times during litigation, but 
the Hawaii legislature apparently attempted  to lower gasoline prices by either: 1) 
lowering the rents to lessee-dealers, which would then be able to pass that savings along 
to consumers, 2) bolstering the profits of lessee-dealers, thereby ensuring the long-term 
survival of a robust network of independent gasoline dealers in the state, or 3) frustrating 
alleged oil company intent to drive lessee-dealers out of the business with excessive 
rents.63  The premise behind this latter goal is that having many independent dealers 
enhances competition among gas stations, including corporate-owned stations, which 
leads to lower prices.
61 See Cashman, 374 F. 3d at 889 (citing to Richardson). 
62
 Haw. Rev. Stat. § 486H-10.4 (1997).
63 Chevron v. Cayetano, 198 F. Supp. 2d. 1182, 1191 (2002) (describing the goals of 
Act 257).
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The Ninth Circuit saw the state’s regulation of gas station rents as analogous to 
Richardson, reasoning that Act 257 would enable independent dealers to capture the 
value of the controls by selling their dealerships to new owners.64  As the District Court 
explained, rather than lower gasoline prices, the rent cap would simply lower the dealer’s 
cost of doing business, allowing the dealer’s profits to increase over what they would 
have been without the regulation.65  Oil companies like Chevron would be forced to bear 
the burden of this cost reduction and, since the economic benefits of the regulation could 
be captured by the dealers upon the sale of their business, the rent cap “will generate a 
premium [in the resale price of dealerships] that reflects the difference between the 
incumbent dealer’s expected market rent and the lower rent.”66  Accordingly, the District 
Court found that the Act was a taking under the first prong of Agins, and the Ninth Circuit 
affirmed.67
On closer examination, though, the regulatory scheme at issue in Chevron differs 
in significant ways from both Richardson and Cashman.  Most essentially, the 
characteristic of divided asset ownership is entirely missing.  The independent dealers are 
merely commercial tenants like any others, paying rent on their place of business.  And 
for its part, Chevron does not own the land on which the stations are located – the oil 
64 Chevron v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 34 (9th Cir. 2000).
65 Chevron, 198 F. Supp. 2d. at 1187.
66 Id. at 1189-90.
67 Id. at 1992, aff’d, Chevron v. Lingle, 363 F.3d 846, 858 (9th Cir. 2004).
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companies themselves pay ground rent to third parties.68  Thus, if the dealers in Chevron
do realize a “premium” on the sale of their dealerships, it is not because the asset value of 
their real property has been enhanced by a corresponding reduction in the value of the 
landowners’ estate, as is the case in Richardson and Cashman..
But the differences do not stop there.  Unlike the situation in both Richardson and 
Cashman, Chevron is not forced to stand aside while its tenants freely negotiate the sale 
of their structures to third parties; the contracts between Chevron and its commercial 
tenants “permit the dealer to transfer his or her occupancy rights upon obtaining 
Chevron’s written consent and paying a transfer fee set by Chevron.”69  Finally, in both 
Cashman and Richardson, the landowners’ only commercial dealings with their tenants 
was via the ground lease that was the subject of the regulation.  Once rent control was 
adopted, it imposed a clearly defined and measurable burden on the landowners, and 
delivered an identical financial benefit, readily capable of capitalization, to their tenants.  
In Chevron, however, the oil company’s leases with its independent dealers are combined 
with oil supply contracts requiring that the gasoline sold at the dealers’ service stations be 
purchased from Chevron.  Thus, wholly unlike Cashman and Richardson, the commercial 
landlords in Chevron may be able to recover their reduced rent revenues in the form of 
higher oil prices under the supply contracts.  This would eliminate any possibility of 
premiums in the resale price of dealerships, regardless of what those premiums might 
actually represent.  In such a case, Chevron would not suffer a financial harm due to the 
68 Id. at 1185.
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imposition of rent control, although of course this mitigation would also negate the 
regulation’s intended objective of lowering gasoline prices.  The Act would thereby be an 
unjust imposition on Chevron and feckless intervention in the market by regulators, but 
distinguished from the takings in Richardson and Cashman.
Despite the serious economic and legal distinctions between Chevron on the one 
hand, and Richardson and Cashman on the other, the three decisions have been linked 
together by critics of Agins, who claim that these rent control cases are an example of 
judicial authority substituting its judgment for that of the legislature.  To some extent, 
particularly in Chevron, the Ninth Circuit has left itself open to this criticism by seeming 
to reduce the substantial advancement analysis to a simple means/ends test.  For the 
reasons set out in Part III I think this criticism is misplaced, but it is first worth 
considering why means/ends analysis of economic regulation is so widely regarded as 
problematic.
B.  Lochner and Nebbia Frame the Judicial Review 
of Economic and Property Regulation
The Supreme Court faces a tension in reviewing property regulations due to the 
post-New Deal conception of “judicial restraint.”  Any sensible meaning of the takings 
clause requires the Court to be concerned with abridgements of property rights, but what 
sort of abridgments and of what type of property are questions the Court does not answer 
by reference to Constitutional text alone.
69 Chevron v. Cayetano, 224 F.3d 1030, 1032 (9th Cir. 2000) (emphasis added).
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Judicial attempts to proscribe the limits of legislative authority with respect to 
property regulations are typically tarred as akin to Lochner v. New York,70 which is raised 
as self-evident proof of imprudence.  As is well known, the Court’s mode of analysis in 
Lochner was to determine “which of two powers or rights shall prevail–the power of the 
state to legislate or the right of the individual to liberty of person and freedom of 
contract.”71  The labor law regulating the hours of bakers involved in that case was 
invalidated as beyond the police power because it did not bear “a more direct relation, as 
a means to an end”72 to the workers’ health and safety.  Hostility to this approach to 
constitutional adjudication is fairly represented by the assertion that it allows “Supreme 
Court justices [to let] their ‘subjective’ and ‘political’ passions draw them into a kind of 
judicial review that is both anti-democratic and institutionally suicidal.”73
The Court subsequently abandoned not merely the factual premises supporting the 
Lochner decision, but its entire mode of analysis.  Instead of a close means/ends scrutiny 
of economic regulation, the Court announced a new policy to steer it clear of charges of 
subjectivity or political bias.  In Nebbia v. New York,74 the Court held that “[a] state is 
70 198 U.S. 45.
71 Id. at 57.
72 Id.
73 Duncan Kennedy, Toward an Historical Understanding of Legal Consciousness: 
The Case of Classical Legal Thought in America, 1850-1940, 3 Res. L. & Soc. 3, 10 
(1980).  See also, Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 861-62 (O’Conner, J., 
plurality opinion) (describing the court’s loss or “lack of prescience” by adopting 
Lochner’s standards of review in cases involving economic regulation).
74 291 U.S. 502.
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free to adopt whatever economic policy may be reasonably deemed to promote public 
welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are 
without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, 
to override it.”75
If it is understood as a means/ends test, Agins has an obvious relation to the mode 
of analysis forgone by Nebbia.  Members of the Court demonstrate their wariness of the 
connection by frequently defending or criticizing takings decisions by reference to 
Lochner.  In Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel,76 for example, Justice Kennedy implores other 
Members to invalidate a pension regulation on the basis of the Due Process Clause rather 
than the Takings Clause.  He assures them that “[i]nsofar as the plurality avoids reliance 
upon the Due Process Clause for fear of resurrecting Lochner[], and related doctrines of 
‘substantive due process,’ that fear is misplaced.”77  In Dolan v. City of Tigard,78 Justice 
Stevens warned that “[t]he so-called ‘regulatory takings’ doctrine . . . has an obvious 
kinship with . . . Lochner.  Besides having similar ancestry, both doctrines are potentially 
open-ended sources of judicial power to invalidate state economic regulations that 
Members of this Court view as unwise or unfair.”79  Once again, in Lucas v. South 
75 Id. at 516.
76 524 U.S. 498 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part).
77 Id. at 556 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
78 512 U.S. 374.
79 Id. at 407 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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Carolina Coastal Council,80 Justice Stevens fears a return to Lochner and laments that he 
“had thought that we had long abandoned this approach to constitutional law.”81  Earlier, 
in Pruneyard Shopping Center v. Robins,82 Justice Marshall warned against “a return to 
the era of Lochner”83 in takings law–a sentiment echoed by Justice Blackman in Loretto 
v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.84
Nebbia is the archetype of contemporary judicial policy: courts defer to legislative 
judgment concerning the constitutionality of regulatory restraints on economic liberty and 
property rights.  This policy is in direct conflict with the previous view that a basic 
function of the court is to maintain the “limit to the valid exercise of the police power by 
the state.”85  The Court had always acknowledged the existence of a “police power” under 
which “the government is free to adopt such laws as are necessary and when these are not 
in conflict with any constitutional prohibitions, or fundamental principles, they cannot be 
successfully assailed in a judicial tribunal.”86  It warned, however, that “under the 
pretense of prescribing a police regulation the State cannot be permitted to encroach upon
80 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
81 Id. at 1069 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
82 447 U.S. 74 (1980).
83 Id. at 93 (Marshall, J., concurring).
84 458 U.S. 419, 455 (1982) (Blackman, J., dissenting).
85 Lochner, 198 U.S. at 56.
86 Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 86 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting).
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any of the just rights of the citizen, which the Constitution intended to secure against 
abridgment.”87
Although reviewing the constitutional propriety of legislation is a core element of 
the separation of powers, the post-Nebbia view is that deference to economic regulation is 
required since “[a]ny departure from . . . judicial restraint would result in courts deciding 
on what is and is not a government function; a practice which has proved impracticable in 
other fields.”88  Yet, the imperative of the takings clause is compensation for government 
takings of property.  It is nearly redundant to point out that the judiciary’s obligation to 
safeguard the liberties protected by the takings clause could not countenance “any 
economic policy [that] may be reasonably deemed to promote the public welfare,”89
where that policy is implemented by regulations that take a property interest from 
individuals for the alleged welfare of the public.90
In order to avoid the charge of “Lochnerism,” the modern Court has adopted an 
expansive conception of the police power such that it will rarely, if ever, distinguish 
between things legislatures may do and things they may not do in the area of economic 
legislation. 
87 Id.
88 United States v. ex rel TVA v. Welch, 327 U.S. 546, 552 (1946).
89 Nebbia, 291 U.S. at 516.
90 For a discussion of the history and background rights protected by the takings 
clause, see generally, Bernard Siegan, PROPERTY RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 108-116 (2001).
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Although the term “Lochnerism” is used here to indicate the charges made by 
many commentators,91 it must be noted that term itself evades any consistent definition.  
It is a classic instance of the fallacy of “package-dealing,” which is understood to be “the 
fallacy of failing to discriminate crucial differences.  It consists of treating together, as 
parts of a single conceptual whole or ‘package,’ elements which different essentially in 
nature, truth-status, importance or value.”92  In this instance, “Lochnerism” wrongly treats 
as the same the valid principle of judicial review, arising from legal duties implied by the 
Constitution’s separation of powers, with judicial subjectivism, which is an instance of 
setting aside Constitutional values in favor of personal ones.  The apparent purpose 
of the term is to blur the distinction, leaving it unclear whether the criticism applies to 
the latter or the former.  It thus serves the same function as, e.g., the term 
“McCarthyism,” which fails to discriminate between a valid inquiry into the existence of 
communist agents in positions of the government and the unjust smearing of innocent 
individuals as communist, contrary to or in the absence of evidence.  The function of the
91 A Westlaw search by the author found the term employed in 204 law review and 
journal articles recent enough to be included in the database.
92
  Leonard Peikoff, editor’s footnote to Ayn Rand, The Metaphysical Versus the 
Man-Made, in PHILOSOPHY: WHO NEEDS IT? 24 (Leonard Peikoff, ed., Bobbs-Merrill, 
1982).  The fallacy of the package-deal is related to what Ayn Rand designated “anti-
concepts.”  “An anti-concept is an unnecessary and rationally unusable term designed to 
replace or obliterate some legitimate concept.  The use of anti-concepts gives the listener 
a sense of approximate understanding.  But in the real of cognition, nothing is as bad as 
the approximate . . . .”  Ayn Rand, THE AYN RAND LEXICON 23 (Harry Binswanger, ed., 
Meridian Books, 1988) (quoting Ayn Rand, Credibility and Polarization, in 1 The Ayn 
Rand Letter 1 (1971).
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term “Lochnerism” is to undermine judicial review by obliterating the distinction 
between it and judicial subjectivism, against which there is properly widespread outrage. 
Nevertheless, since the Court has accepted this package-deal as valid criticism, 
charges of “Lochnerism” exert substantial force on legal doctrine relating to economic 
liberties and property rights.  Since all economic regulation “adjust[s] the benefits and 
burdens of economic life,”93 taking from some and giving to others, however, the court is 
left with the question of when a property owner is entitled to compensation for such 
burdens.  It is routinely stated that compensation is owed when the regulation “force[s] 
some people along to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be 
borne by the public as a whole.”94   But the court has had to develop a standard of 
determining what is “fair and just” within boundaries marked by Lochner and Nebbia.  
The Agins test can be understood as the Court’s means of giving the takings clause more 
effect than an application of Nebbia-style deference allows, while attempting to avoid the 
charge that it is proscribing the limits of the police power.
II.  Substantial Advancement Is More Than A Means/Ends Test
Agins cited Nectow v. City of Cambridge,95 a due process challenge to a zoning 
ordinance, in articulating the substantial advancement test.96  At least some arguments 
that Agins mistakenly injected due process language into takings law relate to the Nectow
93 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
94 Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960).
95 277 U.S. 183 (1928).
96 Agins, 447 U.S. at 260 (citing Nectow, 277 U.S. 188)..
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connection.97  This argument is challenged, however, by the fact that Nectow was also 
cited in support of the balancing test established by the Penn Central decision.98  In fact, 
subsequent cases have stated that Agins is the Court’s “general approach” to regulatory 
takings99 and even that the differing language of Agins and Penn Central “cannot . . . 
obscure the fact that the inquiry in each case is the same.”100  The purpose of this section 
is to take a brief tour of the Supreme Court cases establishing the Agins test in order to 
determine what it has come to mean.
A.  A Short History of the Substantial Advancement Doctrine
Agins itself states that the zoning ordinance at issue in that case would have 
effected a taking if “it [did] not substantially advance legitimate state interests.”  Further 
language that could be interpreted as restating the same standard creates ambiguity as to 
exactly what Justice Powell might have meant.  The context is set by the general policy 
that a finding of takings liability “is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, 
rather than a single owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the 
public interest.”101  On the one hand, the “ad hoc,” essentially unprincipled balancing test 
97 See Thomas E. Roberts, Facial Takings Claims Under Agins-Nectow: A 
Procedural Loose End, 24 U. Haw. L. Rev. 623, 640 (2002); Jerold S. Kayden, Land-use 
Regulations, Rationality, and Judicial Review: The RSVP in the Nollan Invitation (Part 
I), 23 Urb. Law. 301, 314-15 (1991).
98 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 125.
99 Riverside Bayview Homes, 474 U.S. at 126.
100 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1024.
101 Agins, 447 U.S. at 260.
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ascribed to Penn Central is implicated by Agins’ statement that the determination 
“requires a weighing of public and private interests.”102
The holding, however, also relies on a cause and effect relationship between the 
zoning ordinance and the alleged burdens that, but for the ordinance, the community 
might bear as a result of Agins’ real estate development: “The specific zoning regulations 
at issue are exercises of the city's police power to protect the residents of Tiburon from 
the ill effects of urbanization.”103  The City argued that intensive development of housing 
on a large parcel previously devoted to open space would have “adverse impacts, such as 
air, noise and water pollution, traffic congestion, destruction of scenic beauty, disturbance 
of the ecology and environment, hazards related to geology, fire and flood, and other 
demonstrated consequences of urban sprawl.”104  Whether the property owner ought to be 
burdened with the maintenance of the status quo is a separate question, but the point for 
purposes of this Article is that the ordinance at issue in Agins bore a cause and effect 
relationship to these alleged state interests: the implementation of the ordinance was 
directly related to eliminating the impact feared by the City.
102 See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (describing past takings cases as “essentially 
ad hoc, factual inquiries, [by which] the Court's decisions have identified several factors 
that have particular significance. The economic impact of the regulation on the claimant 
and, particularly, the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct 
investment-backed expectations are, of course, relevant considerations.  So, too, is the 
character of the governmental action.”) (internal citation omitted).
103 Agins, 447 U.S. at 255.
104 Id. at 262 n.8.
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The phrase “substantially advances legitimate state interests” was repeated next in 
United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes.105  That case considered the scope of the 
Army Corp of Engineers’ jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act and concluded that a 
particular Corps regulation did not constitute a taking.  The Court’s discussion of the 
doctrine was limited to noting that land-use regulation could constitute a taking in 
“extreme circumstances” and referenced Agins’ second prong requiring the denial of 
economically viable use.106  Oddly, after quoting the first prong of Agins, acknowledging 
its continued viability and relevance to the case at hand, the Riverside Bayview Court 
failed to include any consideration of that element of Agins in its analysis.
The analysis of a building permit exaction in Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission 107 began with the recognition that land use regulation must substantially 
advance legitimate state interests to avoid a taking.108 Although Justice Scalia noted that 
“cases have not elaborated on the standards for determining what constitutes a ‘legitimate 
state interest’ or what type of connection between the regulation and the state interest 
satisfies the requirement that the former ‘substantially advances’ the latter,”109 a cause 
and effect relationship between the regulation and the interest is part of the required 
connection.  This aspect of the connection is clear from Justice Scalia’s further analysis, 
105 474 U.S. at 126.
106 Id.
107 483 U.S. 825.
108 Id. at 834.
109 Id.
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in which he assents to the premise that “we may sustain the condition at issue here by 
finding that it is reasonably related to the . . . . burden that the Nollan’s new house creates 
or to which it contributes.”110  In fact, however, the specific condition the Commission 
imposed – conveying lateral beach access to the public – was found to be unrelated to the 
specific burdens the Commission claimed would be created by enlarging the Nollans’ 
house: interference with passing motorists’ “visual access” to the beach,111 and the 
creation (in conjunction with other proposed building activity) of a “psychological
barrier” between viewers and the sea.112  Because the Nollans’ project in no way 
encumbered the public’s lateral access to the beach, there was no cause and effect 
relationship between the condition and any public burden actually created by the 
enlargement of the home. 
Pursuing the cause-and-effect analysis even further, Justice Scalia added, “If the 
Nollans were being singled out to bear the burden of California’s attempt to remedy [the 
‘psychological barrier’ to public beach access allegedly created by intensive beachfront 
development], although they had not contributed to it more than other coastal 
landowners, the State’s action, even if otherwise valid, might violate either . . . the 
Takings Clause or the Equal Protection Clause.”113  That issue was not necessary to 
decide, however, as the case was resolved on other grounds.  In addition, Justice Scalia 
110 Id. at 838.
111 Id.
112 Id.
113 Id. at 836 n. 4 (emphasis added).
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pointedly distinguished the substantial advancement doctrine from traditional due process 
analysis:  “We have required that the regulation ‘substantially advance’ the ‘legitimate 
state interest,” and not merely that “the state ‘could rationally have decided’ that the 
measure adopted might achieve the State’s objective.”114
Keystone Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictus raised the substantial 
advancement doctrine again, citing to both Agins and Penn Central.115  The Court held 
that a regulation prohibiting a company from mining certain underground coal was not a 
taking.  The Court relied on the fact that mining would cause subsidence of land above 
the mines and, therefore, the regulation“abate[d] activity akin to a public nuisance.”116
While Justice Stevens attempted a “balancing” analysis,117 the holding appears to truly 
rest on the Court’s recognition of the proper bounds of the police power.  Although the 
private individuals who owned the land above the mining operations contractually 
bargained for the risk of subsidence, the Court held that “they erred in taking a risk”118
which was not exclusively theirs to accept.  Private bargaining, according to the Keystone
majority, “cannot estop the Commonwealth from exercising its police power to abate 
activity akin to a public nuisance.”119
114 Id. at n.3.
115 480 U.S. 470.
116 Id. at 488.
117 Id. at 495-499.
118 Id. at 488.
119 Id.
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This holding was obviously at odds with the Court’s judgment 75 years earlier, in 
which a nearly identical scenario resulted in a taking,120 but which the Keystone Court 
now regarded as a “prime example” of valid expansion of the police power to meet 
“changed circumstances.”121  Except to reinforce the Court’s view that Agins remained 
the general test for takings, in application Keystone did little more than reiterate a truism: 
that the state is not liable for a taking when it restricts nuisances or other uses of property 
that violate the rights of others.122  The fact that the activity abated in Keystone was not in 
fact a nuisance123 indicates the judicial discretion inherent in the substantial advancement 
doctrine and relates to Part III of this article.
120 See Pennsylvania Coal, 260 U.S. at 413.
121 Keystone, 480 U.S. at 488.  Justice Sutherland’s criticism of the notion that 
constitutional rights change with circumstances is worth noting: “[I]t is urged that the 
question invovled should now receive fresh consideration, among other reasons, because 
of the ‘economic conditions which have supervened’; but the meaning of the Constitution 
does not change with the ebb and flow of economic events.  We frequently are told in 
more general words that the Constitution must be construed in the light of the present.  If 
by that it is menat that the Constitution is made up of living words that apply to every 
new condition which they include, the statement is quite true.  But to say, if that be 
intended, that the words of the Constitution mean today what they did not mean when 
written–that is, that they do not apply to a situation now to which they would have 
applied then–is to rob that instrument of the essential element which continues it in force 
as the people have made it until they, and not their official agents, have made it 
otherwise.”  West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 402-03 (1937) (Sutherland, J., 
dissenting).
122 This was duly noted by the dissent: “a taking does not occur where the 
government exercises its unquestioned authority to prevent a property owner from using 
his property to injure others without having to compensate the value of the forbidden 
use.”  480 U.S. at 511 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
123 Id. at 512 (“This statute is not the type of regulation that our precedents have held 
to be within the "nuisance exception" to takings analysis.”)
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 The court once again reiterated its commitment to the Agins test without applying 
it in Yee.124 The case was brought to the Court on a theory that a rent control regulation 
constituted a permanent physical occupation of a mobile home park owner’s property, 
and was considered under the principles for physical occupation developed in Loretto.125
As has already been mentioned, however, Justice O’Connor’s invocation of the Agins test 
in Yee has triggered a number of challenges to similar rent control ordinances under the 
substantial advancement standard.126
Lucas127 was a substantive application of the second prong of the Agins test, 
wherein a coastal land use regulation not only denied a land owner economically viable 
use of his property, but foreclosed any beneficial or productive use of the land.  The 
connection between the substantial advancement doctrine and nuisance raised in Keystone
was discussed by Justice Scalia, who observed that cases focused on the “harmful and 
noxious” use of property were “the progenitor of our more contemporary statements that 
‘land-use regulation does not effect a taking if it ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state 
interests.’”128  South Carolina’s regulation prohibited development of coastal lands on the 
avowed basis of “protecting life and property.”129  For the Court to simply negate that 
124 503 U.S. 519.
125 Id. at 534.
126 See supra, text at note 36.
127 505 U.S. 1003.
128 Id. at 1025
129 S.C. Code 1976, §§ 48-39-250 (1)(a) (1993).
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judgment would be to impose an independent view of the importance of coastal 
preservation, subjecting it to the criticism associated with Lochner.  It is evident, 
however, that deference to laws that do not fall within any traditional standard of harm or 
nuisance prevention provides little judicial protection against state abridgments of 
property rights.  Furthermore, the “life and liberty” rationale advanced in Lucas could 
reasonably be regarded as mere pretext.  As the Court noted, the dissenting South 
Carolina Supreme Court Justices reasoned that “the chief purposes of the legislation, 
among them the promotion of tourism and the creation of a ‘habitat for indigenous flora 
and fauna,’ could not fairly be compared to nuisance abatement.”130
Nevertheless, since the Court is unwilling to expressly proscribe a limit to the 
police power or assert independent judgment as to what constitutes a nuisance (e.g. what 
sort of uses of property interfere with the bona fide rights of others), it disavows these 
considerations as standards for takings liability.  This disavowal removes the necessity for 
the Court to formally rule on what is or is not a “harm” and has become a central aspect 
of the substantial advancement doctrine.  The “distinction between ‘harm-preventing’ and 
‘benefit-conferring’ regulation,” according to the Lucas Court, “is often in the eye of the 
beholder.”131
When it is understood that “prevention of harmful use” was 
merely our early formulation of the police power 
130 Id. at 1010 (quoting Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 304 S.C. 376, 396, 
404 S.E.2d 896, 906 (1991)).
131 Id. at 1024.
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justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) 
any regulatory diminution in value; and that the distinction 
between regulation that “prevents harmful use” and that 
which “confers benefits” is difficult, if not impossible, to 
discern on an objective, value-free basis; it becomes self-
evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone 
to distinguish regulatory “takings”--which require 
compensation–from regulatory deprivations that do not 
require compensation. A fortiori the legislature's recitation 
of a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for 
departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory 
takings must be compensated.132
As applied in Lucas, the disavowal favored property rights since it stripped  the 
declaration of harm by the State of legal significance.  Without a coherent standard of 
individual rights, however, the disavowal is just as likely to disadvantage property rights.
In Dolan v. City of Tigard,133 the Court built on Nollan.  “We must first 
determine whether the ‘essential nexus’ exists between the ‘legitimate state interest’ and 
the permit condition exacted by the city,”134 wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist.  If such a 
nexus is found, the Court “must then decide the required degree of connection between 
132 Id.
133 512 U.S. 374.
134 Id. at 386.
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the exactions and the projected impact of the proposed development.”135  For the first 
time, however, Dolan made explicit the type of government interests that must be 
substantially advanced to comply with Agins.  Reflecting on Nollan, the Court noted the 
tenuous relationship in that case between the preservation of ocean visibility and the 
California Coastal Commission’s requirement of a lateral easement across the Nollan’s 
property.  “How enhancing the public’s ability to ‘traverse to and along the shorefront’ 
served the same governmental purpose of ‘visual access to the ocean’ from the roadway 
was beyond [the Court’s] ability to countenance.”136 Dolan further emphasizes the 
causal nature of the Agins test.  The Court’s role is to review  the regulation to determine  
whether “the required dedication is related both in nature and extent to the impact of the 
proposed development.”137
Justice Scalia reaffirmed this understanding of the substantial advancement 
doctrine in his concurring and dissenting opinion in Pennell v. City of San Jose.138
There, he stated that to avoid takings liability, property regulations must have “a cause-
and-effect relationship between the property use restricted by the regulation and the 
social evil that the regulation seeks to remedy.”139  Where no cause and effect relationship
135 Id.
136 Id. at 387.
137 Id. at 391.
138 485 U.S. 1.
139 Id. at 20 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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exists, there is no governmental interest “legitimately furthered by regulating the use of 
property.”140
City of Monterey v. Del Monte Dunes141 again reaffirmed the substantial 
advancement doctrine, but did not apply it directly.  Rather, the Court considered 
the propriety of jury instructions including the first prong of Agins in a case to 
determine takings liability for repeatedly withholding a building permit.  Justice Kennedy 
cited seven cases invoking the substantial advancement standard and noted that “concerns 
for proportionality animate the Takings Clause,”142 concluding that the jury instruction 
was “consistent with our previous general discussions of regulatory takings liability.”143
Finally, in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Tahoe Regional Planning 
Agency,144 the Court decided that a temporary development moratoria did not constitute a 
categorical taking under Lucas.  The Court acknowledged the “District Court’s finding 
that the [agency’s] actions represented a proportional response to a serious risk of harm
to [Lake Tahoe],” without which “petitioners might have argued that the moratoria
did not substantially advance a  legitimate state interest.”145   This statement explains why
140 Id. at 18.
141 526 U.S. 687.
142 Id. at 702.
143 Id. at 704.
144 535 U.S. 302 (2002).
145 Id. at 334.
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 the substantial advancement test had no role in Tahoe-Sierra, although its mention 
reaffirms the test’s continued viability.  
B.  Cause and Effect As a Solution To the Problems of Lochner
and Extreme Deference To Legislation
To the extent the Ninth Circuit applies the Agins standard merely to scrutinize the 
efficacy of property regulation in achieving any State interest, it fails to address the core, 
cause and effect nature of the test.  Simple means/ends scrutiny is not evident in the cases 
that have established the substantial advancement standard and would clash with post-
Nebbia notions of judicial restraint.  It has been recognized by some commentators that 
what appears to be in some cases a means/ends analysis is in fact a cause and effect 
model for reviewing legislation that impinges on the right to use or exclude others from 
using certain types property.146  Professor Molly McUsic comments: “Its animating 
principle is that no value can be taken from the owner and given to the public; the public 
is only permitted to recoup what the owners themselves take by imposing harm.”147
That principle is consistent with the foregoing review of the cases.  If the Court 
applied this principle consistently, however, it would have an equivalent effect on 
property–and perhaps all economic regulation–as Lochner’s forbidden due process 
analysis.  The principle has not been applied consistently, however, as is clear from the 
many cases in which opposite results would have been found were it operative.  As I 
describe below, the Court employs various limiting principles as barriers against taking 
146 See, e.g., Radford, supra note 8, at 390-391; McUsic, supra note 13, at 639.
147 McUsic, supra note 13, at 645.
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the principle so far as to be, as its critics accuse, a return to abandoned standards of 
judicial review in property rights cases. In Nollan the Court stated that a “permit 
condition that serves the same legitimate police-power purpose as a refusal to issue the 
permit should not be found to be a taking if the refusal to issue the permit would not 
constitute a taking.”148
“Unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the 
development ban,” however, “the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use 
but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’”149  The latter is a case in which the “evident 
constitutional propriety disappears” because “the condition substituted for the prohibition 
utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the prohibition.”150  Two 
points are notable from that statement.
First, it appears that a regulation conditioning the development of the Nollans’ 
property would have been legitimate only to the extent that it served the same ends as the 
prohibition.  Second, said prohibition would be a taking if it was not a proper exercise of 
the police power.  This is clearly a cause and effect, rather than a mean/ends concern.  
One can also conclude from Nollan that the review for whether regulations substantially
148 Nollan, 483 U.S. 836.
149 Id. at 837 (quoting J.E.D. Associates, Inc. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 
(1981)).
150 Id.
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advance legitimate governmental interests includes an assumption that only regulations 
that implement relatively traditional police powers are legitimate.151
The dissents in Nollan show that not only is a cause and effect understanding of 
the Agins test logical, it is in fact the meaning the Court intended.  Justice Blackmun 
described the Court’s interpretation of the takings clause as requiring a “necessary 
correlation between a burden created by development and a condition imposed pursuant 
to the State’s police power to mitigate that burden.”152  Justice Brennan likewise objects 
to the “Court’s unusual demand for a precise match between the condition imposed
[by the Coastal Commission in exchange for a building permit] and the specific
type of burden on [public beach] access created by the”153 development.  He 
contrasts this approach to the general policy of judicial deference to legislative 
determinations in economic liberty cases, citing a line of  cases descending  directly from
151 The phrase the “police power” is nebulous and the source of much trouble in 
takings jurisprudence due to the Court’s unwillingness to establish any firm definition.  
As is discussed in part III, however, despite the Court’s disavowal it must import some 
elements of a physical invasion test for nuisance: uses of property which physically 
invade, or destroy the quiet use and enjoyment in an equivalent manner, cannot be 
protected.
152 Nollan, 483 U.S. 825, 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 842.
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 the policies announced in Nebbia.154  As Justice Blackmun describes it, the substantial 
advancement doctrine applied in Nollan is an “eye for an eye mentality.”155
This point is made again by Justice Scalia’s concurrence and dissent in Pennell.  
Appellants in that case argued that a rent control ordinance “that provid[ed] financial 
assistance [in the form of reduced rent] to impecunious renters is not a state interest that 
can be legitimately furthered by regulating the use of property.”156   This type of 
regulation is distinguished from zoning restrictions, asserts Justice Scalia, because when 
such regulations do not eliminate the economic use of property, “there is a cause-and-
effect relationship between the property use restricted by the regulation and the social evil 
that the regulation seeks to remedy.”157  The relationship described here is not merely 
154 In support of the appeal for more judicial deference, Justice Brennan cites 
Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 466 (1981) (noting “this Court’s 
review of the rationality of a State’s exercise of its police power demands only that the 
State ‘could rationally have decided’ that the measure might achieve the State’s 
objective”); Williamson v. Lee Optical of Oklahoma, Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 487 (1955) (“It 
is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought that the 
particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it.”); Day-Bright Lighting, 
Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421, 423 (1952) (“[S]tate legislatures have new techniques; 
they are entitled to their own standard of the public welfare.”); United States v. Carolene 
Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 154 (noting “that the exercise of police power will be upheld 
‘if any state of facts either known or which could reasonably assumed affords support for 
it.”). 
155 This understanding of Nollan is affirmed and repeated by Justice Scalia in his 
dissent from denial of cert. in Lambert v. City and County of San Francisco, 529 U.S. 
1045, 45 (2000) (citing Nollan and Dolan for the proposition that “a burden imposed as a 
condition of permit approval must be related to the public harm that would justify 
denying the permit, and must be roughly proportional to what is needed to eliminate that 
harm.).
156 Pennell, 485 U.S. at 18 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
157 Id. at 20.
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means/ends, or the relationship between a regulation and its goal.   Rather, it is the 
relationship between the property’s use and the goal of the regulation.  “Since the owner’s 
use of the property is (or, but for the regulation would be) the source of the social 
problem, it cannot be said that he has been singled out unfairly.”158  It follows that since a 
renter’s poverty is “no more caused or exploited by landlords”159 than anyone else, it is 
unfair to force them to accept lesser rent for their housing in order to aid them.   This idea 
is in accord with Professor McUsic’s statement that “the public is only permitted to 
recoup what the owners themselves take by imposing harm.”160
In contrast to means/ends analysis, a cause and effect analysis is more appropriate 
for the takings clause.  Whereas legislation judged outside the bounds of legislative 
authority was struck under Lochner,161 the substantial advancement inquiry leaves the 
legislation in place but requires compensation when the legislation burdens individuals 
with costs properly borne by the public as a whole.
158 Id. 
159 Id. at 21.
160 McUsic, supra note 13, at 645.
161 One might get the impression from the rhetoric surrounding Lochner that the 
Court’s scrutiny of economic legislation brought the federal government to a halt.  In fact, 
commentators most opposed to Lochner number the statutes struck down on substantive 
due process grounds at something less than 5 per year from the 1890s to the 1930s, 
whereas more careful analysis shows that “only by greatly stretching the definition of 
substantive due process does the figure reach 160. Under a more restricted conception of 
the term, the Supreme Court invalidated slightly over fifty laws on substantive due 
process grounds during the Lochner era.”  See Michael J. Phillips, How Many Times Was 
Lochner-Era Substantive Due Process Effective?, Mercer L. Rev. 1049 (1997).
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A literal cause and effect requirement, however, would place limits on legislative 
action similar to those imposed by strict means/ends analysis, inviting the same criticisms 
as Lochner.  In practice, if compensation is required to the degree that a close causal 
nexus is lacking, the cost would be so high as to discourage many currently accepted 
types of regulation.  The very nature of the regulatory state is to “adjust the benefits and 
burdens of economic life”162 and, according to the Court, “[g]overnment hardly could go 
on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying 
for every such change in the general law.”163  The Court therefore employs various 
limiting principles and one ambiguity to restrain the “eye for an eye” principle from 
becoming a general standard of review of economic regulation.
First, the Court limits the application of the regulatory takings doctrine to cases in 
which it finds regulations that affect “specific and identified”164 property rights deemed, 
for various reasons, worthy or protection.165   Once the prerequisite property interest is 
162 Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124.
163 Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413, 43 S.Ct. 158, 159, 67 L.Ed. 
322 (1922).
164 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 541 (1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring
and dissenting in part).
165 Id. (citing categories of property interests protected by the takings clause in prior 
cases: air rights for high-rise buildings, Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124; zoning on parcels 
of real property, e.g., MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340 
(1986); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255 (1980); trade secrets, Ruckelshaus v. 
Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984); right of access to property, e.g., PruneYard 
Shopping Center v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74 (1980); Kaiser Aetna; right to affix on structures, 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982); right to transfer 
property by devise or intestacy, e.g., Hodel v. Irving, 481 U.S. 704 (1987); creation of an 
easement, Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (1994); Nollan v. California Coastal 
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established, the general framework for a substantial advancement inquiry begins with the 
presumption of constitutionality.  In short, regulation does not effect a taking unless it 
fails to evince a cause and effect relationship between the regulation and some “social 
evil” stemming from the use of that property.  Within the context of a valid cause and 
effect relationship, a means/ends inquiry is applied to ensure that there is a close fit: an 
“essential nexus,” or a “rough proportionality” between the burdens of the governmental 
restriction and the property’s contribution to the “social evil.”166  Where no such fit 
exists, or no cause and effect relationship can be established, the regulation is susceptible 
to takings liability.
This framework limits the “eye for an eye” principle to a small class of property 
interests that do not significantly conflict with the precedent established since Nebbia and 
exempts from takings scrutiny the vast majority of economic regulations.167  Further 
Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987); right to build or improve, Lucas; liens on real property, 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40 (1960); right to mine coal, Keystone Bituminous 
Coal Assn. v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470 (1987); right to sell personal property, Andrus 
v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979); and the right to extract mineral deposits, Goldblatt v. 
Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590 (1962); United States v. Central Eureka Mining Co., 357 U.S. 
155 (1958).
166 If one disregards the cause and effect context of the substantial advancement 
inquiry, one may misconstrue cases with a means/ends component, such as Nollan and 
Dolan, as intruding into Due Process territory.
167 Professor McUsic’s thesis concerning the class of property interests protected is 
compelling: in essence, land use and environmental regulations are the subject of the 
Court’s heightened takings scrutiny because they were not “previously adjudicated and 
whose form can be distinguished from the laws” invalidated under the standards of 
Nebbia and its progeny.  As a consequence, the Agins test is highly unlikely to migrate to 
broader economic regulation related to the concerns of the New Deal, such as wage and 
hour laws.  See McUsic, supra note 22, at 595.
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removed from this category are regulations abating nuisances, activities judged 
sufficiently akin to nuisances, or rights for which the Court can allegedly find no clear 
tradition.  It was a breach of these principles that most concerned Justice Kennedy in 
Eastern Enterprises, causing him to make the observation that “[a]fter the decision in 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, we confronted cases where specific and identified 
properties or property rights were alleged to come within the regulatory takings 
prohibition.”168
A test founded on the relationship between regulation and the mitigation of social 
costs, however, allows the Court to scrutinize the form of regulation rather its ends.  It is 
able, thereby, to claim to meet the Constitutional demands of “fairness and justice” by 
protecting individuals from being singled out to disproportionately bear public burdens, 
while escaping criticism that it is overriding the will of the legislature. 
With the cause-and-effect framework in mind, it is worth returning to the three 
recent Ninth Circuit rent control cases that apply the substantial advancement doctrine.  
The fact that the doctrine can include a means/ends component in any particular case 
makes it easy to misapply, as the Ninth Circuit may have done in the Chevron case, 
inviting charges that the judiciary is “scrutin[izing] the reasonableness or efficacy of 
legislation.”169  To the extent that the Court finds it prudent to preserve protections for 
property rights that have been secured in recent years by the Agins test, it is likely to 
168 Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. at 541.
169 Lingle v. Chevron, 2004 WL 1745842 (Petition for Writ of Certiorari, filed, July 
30, 2004).
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maintain the distinction between Agins and Lochner.  Distinguishing Chevron from 
Richardson and Cashman is one way to do so.
C. The Ninth Circuit Applied the Substantial Advancement Test Differently
in Lingle Than It Did in Richardson and Cashman
On their face the three Ninth Circuit cases bear an easy similarity.  Hawaii’s 
Ordinance 91-95 was held to be a taking in Richardson because condominium owners 
can “captur[e] the net present value of the reduced land rent in the form of a premium, 
mean[ing] that the Ordinance will not substantially further its goal of creating affordable 
owner-occupied housing in Honolulu.”170  In Cashman, Cotati’s Ordinance 680 was
held unconstitutional because it allows the mobile home owner to capture the benefit
of the regulation as a premium upon sale of the coach, “which undermines the City’s 
interest in creating or maintaining affordable housing.”171   In Chevron, “the reduced rent 
mandated by [Act 257] will not flow to consumers in the form of reduced retail prices but 
instead will allow lesee-dealers to capture a premium on their leaseholds.”172
But what does this mean, in terms of a proper application of the substantial 
advancement standard as a cause-effect test?  The “social evil” attributed to the use of the 
landowners’ property in Richardson and Cashman was an inadequate supply of 
affordable housing.173  Whether those who supply housing services like the plaintiffs in 
170 Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1156.
171 Cashman, 374 F.3d 887.
172 Chevron v. Lingle, 363 F.3d 846 (2004).
173 See Richardson,124 F.3d at 1154; Cashman, 374 F.3d 890.  To be sure, the City 
of Cotati sought to obfuscate this point by citing seven specific “purposes” of its rent 
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these cases meaningfully can be said to be the cause of this problem seems at least as 
dubious as that the landlords in Pennell were the cause of their tenants’ poverty,174 but the 
Ninth Circuit followed the Supreme Court’s lead in not second-guessing the legislative 
assumption of causation.  What was obvious on the face of both the Richardson and 
Cashman ordinances, however, was that the regulatory schemes that were imposed in 
these cases would not – indeed, could not – enhance the affordability of housing in those 
communities.  As Professor Hirsch and his colleagues have demonstrated, the economic 
benefits of regulations of this type will simply be capitalized and captured by the initial 
tenants, leaving all subsequent tenants, and society as a whole in exactly the same 
position with respect to the cost of housing, as if rent control did not exist.175  It therefore 
required no great intrusion into the legislative process to recognize that these measures 
would not mitigate any “social evils” created by the plaintiffs, and both cases were easily 
resolved on summary judgment.176
The situation in Chevron was quite different.  The problem the Hawaii legislature 
sought to address was high gasoline prices.  Whether the refiners of gasoline can 
control measure, but the underlying rationale for the measure, like all residential rent 
control laws, was to lower the price of housing.  Id. at 891; see also Birkenfeld v. City of 
Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976).
174 Pennell, 485 U.S. 1, 21-23 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
175 See Hirsch & Hirsch, supra note 55, at 447-48.
176 Richardson,124 F.3d 1150 (9th Cir. 1997);Cashman, 374 F.3d 887 (9th Cir. 
2004).
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reasonably be held to blame for high retail prices is certainly debatable,177 but the causal 
relationship is no doubt closer than that between mobile home parks and a shortage of 
affordable housing.  Once again deferring to the legislative determination of causation, 
however, it is a much closer question whether regulations governing commercial lease 
agreements between producers and dealers could plausibly be expected to relieve pressure 
on consumer prices.  The district court in Chevron v. Cayetano was convinced they could 
not, and granted summary judgment by analogy to Richardson.178  The Ninth Circuit set 
aside this determination, remanding for a factual inquiry into whether dealers would be 
able to capitalize the value of commercial rent control into the price of their franchises.179
The district court apparently interpreted this as a mandate to hear expert testimony on the 
likely effect of the law on retail prices – in other words, conducting a highly intrusive 
means-ends evaluation of whether the regulations would be likely to achieve their stated 
objective.180  It is this aspect of Lingle that has drawn the most heated criticism as a 
return to “Lochnerism;”181 yet ironically, this application of the substantial advancement 
177 According to the United States Department of Energy, the retail price of gasoline 
attributable to refining is no more than 15% in recent years.  See 
http://www.eia.doe.gov/neic/brochure/oil_gas/primer/primer.htm (last visited March 31, 
2005).  This statistic is consistent with California Energy Commission investigations into 
gasoline price increases in 2003.  See http://www.energy.ca.gov/2003_price_spikes/ (last 
visited March 31, 2005).
178 See Chevron v. Cayetano, 57 F. Supp. at 1010.
179 See Chevron, 223 F.3d at 1042.
180 See Chevron, 198 F. Supp. at 1182.
181 See, e.g.,  Lingle, Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, 2004 WL 174582 (filed July 30, 
2004) (stating that the substantial advancement doctrine is “a pretext for [the Ninth 
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standard seems to depart dramatically from the Ninth Circuit’s use of the same test in
Richardson and Cashman, and from the Supreme Court’s apparent intention in 
formulating the standard.
Separating the means-ends application of substantial advancement in Lingle from 
the untroubled cause-effect application in Richardson and Cashman, one nevertheless 
confronts the fact that both frustrate the will of legislatures.
III.  Tension Between the Constitution and the Regulatory State
The Supreme Court’s development of the substantial advancement doctrine has 
followed a pattern aimed at raising the level of judicial protection for property rights, 
while attempting to avoid the appearance that it imposes mere policy choices; that it acts 
as a “super legislature” overriding the will of the legislature when it goes “too far.”  In 
truth, however, the substantial advancement doctrine cannot completely divorce the Court 
from the evaluation of regulatory ends most often associated with means/ends review.  In 
part, this is because the concept of judicial restraint endorsed by the Court since Nebbia
embraces a false dichotomy: Constitutional adjudication is not a struggle between judicial 
and legislative will, but the subordination of legislative will to Constitutional principle.182
Circuit’s] improper judicial invalidation of state legislation based on an intrusive standard 
of review of economic legislation not seen since the days of Lochner . . . .”); Lingle, Brief 
of the States of New York, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners, 2004 WL 
2803196 (filed Dec. 03, 2004) (stating that the Ninth Circuit’s decision “threatens a wide 
array of public protections, by means of the type of intrusive judicial review epitomized 
by Lochner and long ago discredited.”).
182 See, e.g., James W. Ely, Jr., Thomas Cooley, “Public Use,” and New Directions 
in Takings Jurisprudence, 2004 Mich. St. L. Rev. 845, 856 (the notion that “property is 
held at the sufferance of the legislature [is] . . . at odds with the place of private 
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A broader argument concerning the nature and scope of judicial review is beyond this 
paper, but to the extent that the Court holds “value-free” adjudication as an ideal it fails to 
discharge its obligation to protect the values embodied by the Constitution’s text.  
Further, it confuses the idea of judicial review with judicial subjectivism, mistaking the 
rule of law for the idea of “judicial will,” which undermines the moral and legal 
legitimacy of the former.  The argument of this section is more narrow:  to explain why 
the substantial advancement doctrine, albeit changing the form of takings analysis, cannot 
eliminate the necessity of evaluating the Constitutional propriety of regulatory ends.
In every application of a cause/effect standard, a court must necessarily determine 
that the unregulated use of property caused or would cause what Justice Scalia termed the 
“social evil” justifying the regulation.  But as has previously been suggested, what counts 
as a cause of any particular social phenomenon is rife with opportunity for judicial (as 
well as legislative) discretion.183  More importantly, however, one cannot begin to answer 
the question of whether a regulation substantially advances legitimate governmental 
interests unless one has some gauge for determining what governmental interests are 
legitimate.  The substantial advancement doctrine proceeds on the premise that courts
can identify such interests without judicial proscription of the limits of the police
power.  It does so by focusing on the form of regulation rather than its objective:  
ownership in the American constitutional system”) (citing Thomas M. Cooley, A 
TREATISE ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE 
POWER OF THE STATES OF THE AMERICAN UNION 531 (1868)).
183 See supra, text at notes 172, 175.
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specifically, whether the regulation bears a reasonable nexus to the unregulated activities’ 
contribution to an alleged social evil.
But such an inquiry does not achieve the objective of “value-free” adjudication, 
because it merely masks implicit limits on the police power with hidden assumptions.  
Unless the Court makes an independent judgment about which “social evils” are worthy 
of remedying, the Takings Clause fails to provide meaningful protection for a wide 
variety of property rights.  The identification of specific “social evils” and “causes” are 
means by which the Court’s implied limits of the police power are enforced.
To begin an inquiry into the substantial advancement of legitimate governmental 
interests, a court must first identify the phenomenon perceived as problematic by the 
legislature.   In Keystone, for instance, it was the likelihood of subsidence;184 in Dolan, it 
was traffic congestion or the potential for flooding due to more intensive land use;185 in 
Nollan, it was the alleged loss of visual access to beaches;186 in Lucas, it was the alleged 
184 See Keystone, 480 U.S. at 474 (describing damage caused by mining “to 
foundations, walls, other structural members, and the integrity of houses and buildings. 
Subsidence frequently causes sinkholes or troughs in land which make the land difficult 
or impossible to develop. Its effect on farming has been well documented--many subsided 
areas cannot be plowed or properly prepared. Subsidence can also cause the loss of 
groundwater and surface ponds. In short, it presents the type of environmental concern 
that has been the focus of so much federal, state, and local regulation in recent decades.”).
185 See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 377 (noting Oregon’s conditioning “the approval of 
[Dolan’s] building permit on the dedication of a portion of her property for flood control 
and traffic improvements.”).
186 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 828-29 (noting the California Coastal Commission’s 
finding that “the new house would increase blockage of the view of the ocean, thus 
contributing to the development of a wall of residential structures that would prevent the 
public psychologically ... from realizing a stretch of coastline exists nearby that they have 
every right to visit.”).
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degradation of the “coastal zone”due to the development of coastal lands that serve, inter 
alia, as barriers against the tide;187 in Richardson it was the high concentration of 
ownership of condominiums, or else increases in lease prices in excess of inflation;188 in 
Lingle, it is the fact that gas prices on Hawaii exceed prices found on the mainland.189  As 
the first step in applying the substantial advancement inquiry, it is necessary to 
distinguish which of these effects may rightfully be mitigated by imposing regulatory 
restrictions on the use of property, and which may not.  The Court has offered no 
particular standard on this point, stating variously that it requires a “careful examination 
and weighing of all the relevant circumstances”;190 that “[o]ur cases have not elaborated 
on the standards for what constitutes a ‘legitimate state interest,’ but they have made clear 
. . . that a broad range of governmental purposes and regulations satisfy these 
requirements”;191 that “we have eschewed any set formula for determining when justice 
and fairness require that economic injuries caused by public action be compensated”;192
187 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1010 (citing the “‘uncontested ... findings’ of the South 
Carolina Legislature that new construction in the coastal zone--such as petitioner 
intended--threatened this public resource.”).
188 See Richardson, 124 F.3d at 1154 (describing the object of the regulation to 
“break up this pattern of land ownership and control the escalating prices of housing.”).
189 See Lingle, Brief for Petitioners, WL 103793 (filed January 14, 2005) (stating that 
the “purpose of the act is to combat the effects of alleged concentration in the Hawaii 
market for gasoline, which the Legislature said was resulting in higher gasoline prices and 
hurting consumers and the public.”).
190 Palazzolo, 553 U.S. at 636 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
191 Nollan, 483 U.S. at 834-35.
192 Penn Central at 124.
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and warning against any standard that “would transform government regulation into a
luxury few governments could afford.”193
There must, however, be some operative theory of individual rights against which 
the Court measures the use of property and its impact on third parties.  The Court must 
have a clear concept of what constitutes a “social evil.”  Without such a distinction, the 
substantial advancement inquiry relies entirely on the Court’s finding that a particular use 
of property is responsible for its sub silentio definition of harm.  Were the Court to apply 
Nebbia-style deference to all legislative declarations of harm, any social phenomenon 
perceived as problematic could simply be declared a nuisance, and regulatory measures 
ostensibly aimed at its abatement could thereby avoiding takings liability altogether.  As 
Justice Scalia pointed out in Lucas:
When it is understood that “prevention of harmful use” was 
merely our early formulation of the police power 
justification necessary to sustain (without compensation) 
any regulatory diminution in value; and that the distinction 
between regulation that "prevents harmful use" and that 
which "confers benefits" is difficult, if not impossible, to 
discern on an objective, value-free basis; it becomes self-
evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone 
to distinguish regulatory "takings"--which require 
193 Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council v. Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 
323 (2002).
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compensation–from regulatory deprivations that do not 
require compensation . . . . [T]he legislature’s recitation of 
a noxious-use justification cannot be the basis for departing 
from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must 
be compensated.  If it were, departure would virtually 
always be allowed.194
At least with respect to regulations that deprive property of all economically 
viable use, therefore, Lucas demands that any nuisance-like limitation on property rights 
cited as  justification “cannot be newly legislated or decreed (without compensation), but 
must inhere in the title itself, in the restrictions that background principles of the State’s 
law of property and nuisance already place upon land ownership.”195  Such a standard is 
“value-free” according to the Court because it draws on the “the historical compact 
recorded in the Takings Clause that has become part of our constitutional culture”196
regarding land use.  This standard, however, does not apply to other forms of property or 
regulations that do not destroy all economically viable use since “the property owner 
necessarily expects the uses of his property to be restricted, from time to time, by various 
measures newly enacted by the State in legitimate exercise of its police powers.”197
194 Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1026.
195 Id. at 1027.
196 Id. at 1028.
197 Id. at 1027-28.
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But this last condition comes full circle by begging the question of what are 
legitimate exercises of the state’s police powers.  It leaves to the discretion of the Court 
the standard for determining which “social ills” may be mitigated by uncompensated 
regulation in cases involving less than a total deprivation of all economiclly viable use of 
property.   As a result, one can easily identify disagreements as to what constitutes the 
legitimate mitigation of such a “social evil” among the Members of the Court.  For 
example, classifying the abatement of subsidence as an objective sufficeintly “legitimate”  
to justify uncompensated resrictions on property rights, so obvious to Justice Stevens in 
Keystone, apparently came as a surprise to Chief Justice Rehnquist:
The ease with which the Court moves from the recognition 
of public interests to the assertion that the activity here 
regulated is “akin to a public nuisance” suggests an 
exception far wider than recognized in our previous cases. . 
. . A broad exception to the operation of the Just 
Compensation Clause based on the exercise of multifaceted 
health, welfare, and safety regulations would surely allow 
government much greater authority than we have 
recognized to impose societal burdens on individual 
landowners, for nearly every action the government takes is
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intended to secure for the public an extra measure of 
“health, safety, and welfare.”198
Likewise, Justice Stevens found it “unfortunate” that the 1972 ordinance aimed at 
maintaining the clarity of the water at Lake Tahoe “allowed numerous exceptions and did 
not significantly limit the construction of new residential housing.”199  Despite the 
Court’s commitment to “value-free” adjudication, Justice Stevens here stakes out a 
personal preference for regulating the algae content in Lake Tahoe through 
comprehensive restrictions on housing development.   The Court enforces that preference 
without reference to a standard of harm.  It merely assumes that maintaining the clarity of 
the lake’s water is a sufficiently legitimate police power function to justify the effective 
extinguishment, without compensation, of the right to build a home on one’s land.  
Similar fundamental value judgments are expressed by way of conclusory assertion in 
Nollan, Dolan, and Richardson as well.200
198 Keystone, 480U.S. at 512-13 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
199 Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 309.
200 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 ( “assum[ing], without deciding,” that among the 
legitimate governmental interests is “protect[ion] of the public’s ability to see the beach, 
assisting the public in overcoming the ‘psychological barrier’ to using the beach created 
by a developed shorefront, and preventing congestion on the public beaches.”  In which 
case, “the Commission unquestionably would be able to deny the Nollans their permit 
outright if their new house (alone, or by reason of the cumulative impact produced in 
conjunction with other construction)  would substantially impede these purposes . . .”); 
Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 (stating “[u]ndoubtedly, the prevention of flooding 
along Fanno Creek and the reduction of traffic congestion in the Central Business District 
qualify as the type of legitimate public purposes we have upheld”); Richardson v. City 
and County of Honolulu, 124 F.3d at 1163 (finding legitimate “the City’s interest in 
maintaining affordable owner-occupied residential housing).
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The point of these examples is to illustrate that the cause and effect test embodied 
by Agins cannot save the Court from the need to make independent judgments about the 
nature and scope of “legitimate” governmental objectives; it only moves the evaluation of 
legislative ends to a deeper, and usually implicit, level.  To the extent that the Court 
accepts a particular interest as falling within the sphere of “legitimacy,” and views the 
unregulated use of property as in some sense the “cause” of the problem being addressed, 
compensation may be avoided in the advancement of that interest.201  No change in the 
form of the takings analysis can substitute for the Court’s obligation to promulgate a 
standard for determining when the rights of third parties have been violated by the use of 
property and, therefore, when the state may properly restrict such uses without paying 
compensation.  Where the substantial advancement doctrine has heightened the 
constitutional protection of property rights, it is only to the extent that it has imported 
elements of such a standard from the common law.
201 Always assuming, of course, that Agins’ second prong is satisfied.
The substantial advancement doctrine has been one means by which the Court has 
faced this fact: it removes limited aspects and applications of the right to property from 
the framework of rational basis scrutiny by close examination of the form of confiscatory 
regulation.  As has been demonstrated, however, the formal analysis is effective largely 
because it relies on ambiguity to apply underlying norms about the nature and scope of 
property rights.  
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Addressing the tension between the Constitution and the regulatory state, 
however, is not a “return to Lochner” but a logical necessity of the judicial power.  No 
takings standard will eliminate the need of the Court to evaluate the constitutional 
propriety of regulatory ends.  Constitutional adjudication can never be wholly “value 
free” because the Constitution’s function is the maintenance and protection of definite 
values, foremost among which is the right to property.
CONCLUSION
From the foregoing, three major conclusions can be drawn.  First, the substantial 
advancement doctrine has often been misconstrued as a simple means/ends inquiry.  That 
conception of Agins is inconsistent with the entire thrust of modern judicial review and, 
as such, is frequently criticized as an imprudent “return to Lochner.”  It is therefore 
regrettable that Lingle v. Chevron, the vehicle the Supreme Court has chosen to review 
the substantial advancement standard, is an apparent example of means/ends scrutiny of 
economic legislation, which may be open to that charge.
A careful review of cases invoking the substantial advancement test, however, 
shows that, properly understood, it does not merely scrutinize legislation to determine 
whether an appropriate means/ends relationship is present.  Rather, Agins primarily 
advances a cause and effect test.  When the Court asks whether a regulation substantially 
advances legitimate government interests, certain assumptions are built into those terms.  
Only those interests concerning the mitigation of “social ills” caused by the unregulated 
use of property are deemed legitimate for these purposes.  The test has been described as 
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applying an “eye for an eye mentality”202 because its function is to ensure that the state 
exacts from property owners only that which can reasonably be construed as the 
equivalent of social costs imposed (or exploited) by their use of property.  Such a test 
meets twin goals: 1) it protects certain classes of property from the trap of extreme 
judicial deference created by the Court’s longstanding due process standards of review 
and 2) it gives cover to the Court against charges that, by such exemptions, it is merely 
overriding legislatively determined social policy.
Finally, an analysis of the test illustrates that there is an inherent contradiction 
among these goals, which is not fully resolved by a change in the form of the takings 
inquiry.  While it is proper for judges to be objective and to set their personal values aside 
when evaluating legislation, there is no way to avoid the fact that there are constitutional 
values at odds with several generations of regulatory restrictions on property.
The criticisms of Agins, one may conclude, are not entirely specious.  Although 
the Agins test is by no means a return to Lochner, it does confront many of the questions 
concerning the limits of the police power that have been abdicated by the judiciary since 
Nebbia.  Until this issue is brought to center stage by the Court, takings doctrine will 
remain a swamp of unstated assumptions relying on doctrinal ambiguities to protect 
constitutional rights.
#          #          #
202 See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 865 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
